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With international travel, Zika virus (ZIKV) is intro-
duced to Europe regularly. A country’s ability to 
robustly detect ZIKV introduction and local transmis-
sion is important to minimise the risk for a ZIKV out-
break. Therefore, sufficient expertise and diagnostic 
capacity and capability are required in European labo-
ratories. To assess the capacity, quality, operational 
specifics (guidelines and algorithms), technical and 
interpretation issues and other possible difficulties 
that were related to ZIKV diagnostics in European 
countries, a questionnaire was conducted among 
national reference laboratories in 30 countries in the 
European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) in 
May 2016. While the coverage and capacity of ZIKV 
diagnostics in the EU/EEA national reference labora-
tories were found to be adequate, the assessment of 
the quality and needs indicated several crucial points 
of improvement that will need support at national and 
EU/EEA level to improve ZIKV preparedness, response 
and EU/EEA ZIKV surveillance activities.
Introduction
Zika virus (ZIKV) infections were historically not consid-
ered a significant public health concern [1]. However, 
in the year following its first autochthonous transmis-
sion in the Americas in 2015, ZIKV has been linked to 
severe congenital anomalies in newborns and to other 
neurological disorders such as Guillain–Barré syn-
drome (GBS) [2]. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared the cluster of microcephaly cases and other 
neurological disorders possibly associated with ZIKV 
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(PHEIC) on 1 February 2016 [3]. By the end of 2016, the 
unprecedented ZIKV outbreak affected 48 countries 
and territories in the Americas with more than half a 
million human cases [4]. The PHEIC was declared over 
on 18 November 2016 with the argument that ZIKV-
associated congenital syndrome was considered to be 
a long-term public health challenge requiring a long-
term commitment to control and prevent [4,5].
ZIKV is a mosquito-borne virus which belongs to the 
genus Flavivirus, family Flaviviridae [6]. Its genome 
can be detected in biological samples by reverse tran-
scription PCR (RT-PCR) and the virus can be isolated in 
cell culture. However, viraemia is typically short-lived 
(3–7 days after onset of symptoms) [6-8], although 
an increased window of detection has been observed 
using urine (up to 20 days after onset of symptoms) [8] 
or whole blood (up to 100 days after onset of symp-
toms) [9]. Consequently, the full spectrum of diag-
nostics includes serology, which is complex owing to 
extensive cross-reactivity with antibodies triggered by 
other flaviviral infections and/or vaccination [10]. The 
majority of ZIKV infections are asymptomatic which 
complicates retracing the course of infection and 
increases the dependency on serology to confirm an 
infection [10]. This is in particular an issue for pregnant 
women for whom correct diagnosis of a ZIKV infection, 
even if asymptomatic, is imperative [2,11,12].
International travel and outbreaks of ZIKV in European 
overseas countries and territories are responsible for 
the regular introduction of ZIKV to Europe [13-16]. A 
risk assessment by the WHO Regional Office for Europe 
(WHO/Europe) indicated that the risk for an outbreak 
with ZIKV in Europe should not be underestimated, in 
particular in countries with established presence of 
the vectors Aedes aegypti and Ae. albopictus [16,17]. 
A country’s ability to robustly detect ZIKV introduction 
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and local transmission is important to minimise the 
risk for a ZIKV outbreak. Therefore sufficient expertise 
and diagnostic capacity and capability in European 
laboratories are required [18].
To map ZIKV expertise and identify diagnostic capacity 
and capability gaps in Europe during the initial phase of 
the PHEIC in February 2016, the European Commission 
(EC) asked the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) for a rapid assessment of the capac-
ity of laboratories in Europe to detect ZIKV infections 
and the specific needs for support. The assessment 
was done by an in-depth questionnaire in May 2016. 
Here, the outcomes of the assessment are presented 
and discussed to identify knowledge and technical 
gaps to strengthen laboratory capacity and quality 
for ZIKV diagnostics in the European Union/European 
Economic Area (EU/EEA) and to support ZIKV prepared-
ness and response as well as ZIKV surveillance activi-
ties in the EU/EEA. 
Methods
A questionnaire was designed to address the capac-
ity, quality, operational specifics (guidelines and 
algorithms), technical and interpretation issues and 
other possible difficulties related to ZIKV diagnos-
tics. National reference laboratories for ZIKV diagnos-
tics were asked to complete the online questionnaire 
through the 30 EU/EEA ECDC National Focal Points for 
Microbiology (NMFPs) [15]. The questionnaire was sent 
to the NMFPs on 4 May 2016 and closed on 23 May 
2016. As most questions in the questionnaire where 
not obligatory to answer, the sums in the presented 
data may vary as non-replies are not listed. 
Results
In-country presence of ZIKV diagnostics
In total, 49 laboratories from 30 EU/EEA countries com-
pleted the questionnaire, of which 44 laboratories in 
27 countries indicated that they were conducting ZIKV 
diagnostics by May 2016 (Figure 1).
Legislation
ZIKV infection was made notifiable in 13 countries by 
May 2016, and mandatory disease notification was 
planned for the near future in nine countries. For one 
country, the notification procedure was not specified. 
In agreement with the EU classification [19,20], 34 
laboratories indicated that their operational biosafety 
level (BSL) for ZIKV diagnostics was BSL2. Eight labo-
ratories indicated BSL3 as their operational biosafety 
level, while two laboratories performed ZIKV diagnos-
tics at BSL1. Reasons given by laboratories to devi-
ate from the official level BSL2 were (i) downgrading 
because diagnosis did not involve high titre virus cul-
ture (one laboratory), and (ii) upgrading based on in-
house assessment of biosafety and biosecurity issues 
or for logistical reasons such as aligning ZIKV diagnos-
tics with other flavivirus diagnostic serology and virus 
isolation (three laboratories). The remaining six labora-
tories did not indicate reasons for the deviation.
Because of, at the time putative [21], teratogenic effects 
of ZIKV infection in pregnant women, laboratories con-
ducting ZIKV diagnostics were asked whether special 
regulations for pregnant employees were in place. In 
six of the 33 laboratories that answered this question, 
pregnant employees were not allowed to perform ZIKV 
diagnostic tests. In three additional laboratories, a 
restriction for pregnant employees was limited to han-
dling ZIKV virus culture. The remaining laboratories did 
not have specific guidelines for pregnant employees.
Sample characteristics
All laboratories conducting ZIKV diagnostics (n = 44, 
in 27 countries) performed molecular testing, while 33 
laboratories in 24 countries also conducted serology 
and one laboratory performed antigen detection. The 
laboratories accepted different types of patient sam-
ples, including plasma/serum, urine, semen, amniotic 
fluid, placenta, saliva and nasopharyngeal swabs. All 
Figure 1
Status of availability of Zika virus diagnostics in EU/EEA 
countries by May 2016 (n = 49 laboratories)
ZIKV diagnostics implemented by May 2016
ZIKV diagnostics implemented by January 2017
ZIKV diagnostics not implemented
Did not participate in questionnaire
EU/EEA: European Union/European Economic Area; NMFP: National 
Focal Points for Microbiology; ZIKV: Zika virus.
The number of laboratories that participated in the questionnaire 
on invitation by their country NMFP in the period 4–23 May 2016 
are indicated per country. One country indicated in January 2017 
that they had implemented ZIKV diagnostics since May 2016. Two 
countries without implemented ZIKV diagnostics indicated to have 
access to diagnostics through an agreement with a laboratory in 
another country.
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laboratories received serum samples for primary diag-
nostics, and in addition, clinicians often provided urine 
as a second sample for testing (42/44). Semen (28/44), 
saliva (23/44) and nasopharyngeal swabs (15/44) were 
received to a lesser extent. 
For an adequate choice of diagnostic tests to run and 
for a correct interpretation of results, a minimum of 
information on the patient history is required [22-24]. 
Laboratories were asked to indicate on a Likert scale 
with 1–5 range (1 = never, 5 = always) how often certain 
essential background information about their patient 
samples was provided with the diagnostic requests 
(Figure 2).
Overall, the provision of the date of sampling was 
scored the highest (40/44 laboratories scored this in 
category ‘often’ or ‘always’), while the flavivirus vac-
cination status scored the lowest (17/44 scored it as 
‘often’ or ‘always’). Other data essential for choice of 
testing algorithm and test interpretation such as ‘first 
day of illness’, ‘country and dates of travel’, ‘clinical 
symptoms’ and (in case of women) ‘pregnancy sta-
tus’ were provided with requests in 27 to 36 of the 44 
laboratories.
Most laboratories (26/44) indicated that they could 
directly contact physicians to ask for more information 
about the requested samples or look up record sheets 
and laboratory reports. However, in practice the fea-
sibility of this strongly depended on the daily sample 
load.
Molecular diagnostics
Twenty-one laboratories that conducted ZIKV molecu-
lar detection only used commercially available tests, 
14 laboratories only in-house tests, while nine labo-
ratories indicated using both. The RealStar Zika virus 
RT-PCR kit by Altona (Hamburg, Germany) diagnostics 
was the most widely used commercial test (24/30). The 
most applied in-house RT-PCRs previously described in 
literature were by Lanciotti et al. (5/23) [25] and Faye 
et al. (9/23) [26]. Primary RT-PCRs were mostly carried 
out with a single ZIKV genome target (42/44). However, 
two laboratories performed a multiplex PCR targeting 
multiple viruses which were not specified further.
Positive results were confirmed independently in 16 
of 44 laboratories. This was done either by a second 
RT-PCR targeting a different genome segment (8/16 
laboratories) or through sequencing (5/16). Forty-three 
of 44 laboratories used a positive control, which was 
obtained through the European Virus Archive (https://
www.european-virus-archive.com) in six, through the 
Robert Koch Institute (via former ENIVD expert labo-
ratory network) in 10, from own patient materials in 
14, or by using synthetic RNA in four of 43 laborato-
ries. Twenty-two laboratories indicated that they used 
another positive control, but not the specific source.
Eighteen of 43 laboratories used ZIKV strains of the 
current outbreak in the Americas as a control, while 14 
used strains belonging to the original (pre-2015) Asian 
lineage. African lineage strains were used in 18 labo-
ratories, 10 had access to more than one ZIKV lineage 
as control.
Serology
ZIKV serology was conducted in 24 countries and in 33 
of 44 laboratories with ZIKV diagnostics all of which 
had previous experience with serology-based diagnos-
tics for other flaviviruses, notably dengue virus (DENV, 
32/33), tick-borne encephalitis virus (TBEV, 25/33), 
West Nile virus (WNV, 27/33), Japanese encephalitis 
virus (JEV,20/33) and yellow fever virus (YFV, 21/33). 
Serology was based on IgM detection only (2/33) or 
Figure 2
Access of Zika virus diagnostic laboratories to essential background information on patient samples, EU/EEA, May 2016 
(n = 44)
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on both ZIKV IgM and IgG (31/33). Ten laboratories 
in 10 countries were able to assess the presence of 
ZIKV neutralising antibodies by plaque reduction neu-
tralisation (PRNT) and/or virus neutralisation (VNT) 
tests. Thirty-one of 33 laboratories carried out com-
mercial serology assays. Laboratories either used the 
Euroimmun AG Anti-Zika virus ELISA IgM/IgG (12/31), 
Euroimmun Arboviral Fever Mosaic IF kit (3/31), both 
assays (3/31) or did not specify which assay they used 
(13/31). Thirteen of 33 laboratories used in-house 
assays, including ELISA (2/13) and/or immunofluores-
cence assays (IFA) (6/13), as well as VNT (7/13) and 
PRNT (3/13). The majority of these laboratories (12/13) 
indicated that they obtained their positive control 
material from own patient samples. Four of 13 labora-
tories were provided with ZIKV IgM/IgG positive control 
samples by collaborators.
Quality assessment
To gain insight in the level of quality control at the lab-
oratories that performed ZIKV diagnostics, the labora-
tories were asked to specify their level(s) of laboratory 
accreditation. Analysis at the laboratory level showed 
that International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) 15189 (‘Medical laboratories – requirements for 
quality and competence’ [27]) was implemented at 27 
of the 44 diagnostic laboratories, five laboratories had 
accreditation ISO 17025 (‘General requirements for the 
competence of testing and calibration laboratories’ 
[28]), while two laboratories indicated to have both. 
Three laboratories indicated ISO 15189 accreditation 
was pending or planned. Two laboratories were work-
ing under accreditation ISO 9001 (‘Quality management 
systems – requirements’ [29]) while two laboratories 
indicated that they operated under a national quality 
accreditation system. Five reference laboratories had 
no accreditation at all (data not shown).
Analysis at country level showed 10 of 27 countries 
with reference laboratories with ISO 15189 accredita-
tion, five countries with laboratories with ISO 17025 
accreditation, two countries with laboratories with a 
national accreditation, two countries with laboratories 
with ISO 9001 accreditation, two countries with labora-
tories with both ISO 15189 and ISO 17025 accreditation, 
two countries with laboratories with either ISO 15189 
or no accreditation, one country with a laboratory in 
transition to ISO 15189 and three countries with labo-
ratories without accreditation.
Another quality aspect concerns the extent of valida-
tion of the implemented diagnostics, in particular the 
serology in view of extensive cross-reactivity. The 
median size of in-house validation panels of confirmed 
ZIKV and WNV patients was small (Table 1) and serum 
samples from pregnant women and population panels 
from ZIKV-endemic regions were lacking in most labo-
ratories (Table 1). Thirty-seven of 44 laboratories indi-
cated that they were willing to share validation data 
with other laboratories. However, 15 of the 44 ZIKV 
diagnostic laboratories indicated that their accredita-
tion scheme did not accept validation done elsewhere, 
while this would be a possible option for 22 of 44 
laboratories.
Capacity
Laboratories were asked to indicate how many diag-
nostic samples they could process per week for the dif-
ferent types of test that they run (Figure 3).
Diagnostic capacities of individual laboratories dif-
fered depending on the type of diagnostic test. In addi-
tion, the laboratories were asked how many samples 
they had processed and determined positive for molec-
ular, IgM, IgG and neutralising antibody testing since 1 
January 2016 (Table 2). For 33 of 44 laboratories offer-
ing molecular testing, the cumulative number of total 
requests in the 18-week period covered in the ques-
tionnaire (including requests in support of other labo-
ratories) remained below their indicated capacity per 
week. For 8 of 44 laboratories, the cumulative number 
of requests was approximately two or three times the 
indicated weekly capacity, while for three laboratories, 
it exceeded their capacity (five to 10-fold). For serol-
ogy, a vast majority of the laboratories had a cumula-
tive number of requests for the 18-week period that 
was two to three times their weekly capacity.
Fourteen of 44 laboratories indicated that they sup-
ported other laboratories by performing molecular 
tests for them. Fifteen laboratories supported others 
with serological testing and 12 laboratories with pro-
vision of control materials. The majority of the labora-
tories (24/29) that had not offered laboratory support 
Figure 3
Diagnostic capacity for different types of tests for Zika 
virus (samples/week) in EU/EEA reference laboratories, 
May 2016 (n = 44)
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until May 2016 indicated that they would be willing to 
if needed.
ZIKV testing algorithm
Laboratories mainly implemented the ZIKV testing 
algorithms either as advised by ECDC (18/44) [30] or 
by their National Public Health institutes (18/44). The 
remaining eight laboratories followed, among other 
algorithms, the ZIKV diagnostic algorithms advised by 
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) [31]. In 
case necessary background information such as first 
day of illness was not known, ten of the 44 diagnostic 
laboratories performed both molecular and serologi-
cal tests on the available samples, three always car-
ried out serology, two always performed RT-PCR, while 
three only conducted the tests that were asked for by 
the clinician. Ten laboratories either asked for more 
information or an additional sample from the patient 
for an interpretation based on kinetics. The remaining 
16 did not provide that answer. 
Laboratories were also asked if there was a different 
testing algorithm for asymptomatic pregnant women 
with putative ZIKV exposure. Ten laboratories indicated 
that they asked for paired serum samples of asympto-
matic pregnant women for serology, while 16 laborato-
ries did both molecular and serological testing on the 
available samples. Eight laboratories referred to their 
national ZIKV diagnostic algorithm and one labora-
tory indicated that asymptomatic patients were never 
tested regardless of pregnancy status.
Diagnostic challenges
Laboratories were asked to describe the main chal-
lenges they were faced with during the implementa-
tion of ZIKV molecular and/or serological diagnostics. 
The main indicated obstacles were the availability of 
a positive control and validation materials for molecu-
lar and serological tests, the availability of commercial 
serological tests and personnel capacity (Figure 4).
Discussion
In May 2016, there was an EU/EEA-wide coverage for 
ZIKV molecular diagnostics. Only three countries were 
without in-country ZIKV molecular diagnostics but all 
had access to diagnostics through an agreement with 
a laboratory in another country and two had plans 
to implement ZIKV diagnostics in the near future. Of 
these, one country had implemented ZIKV molecular 
diagnostics by January 2017 (Figure 1). In compari-
son to a February 2016 snapshot for the EC (data not 
shown), four more EU/EEA countries had implemented 
ZIKV molecular diagnostics in May. The coverage for 
ZIKV serology increased from 17 EU/EEA countries to 
24. Access to ZIKV serology is particularly important 
because the confirmation or ruling out of a ZIKV infec-
tion during pregnancy is essential for medical follow-
up regarding the teratogenicity of ZIKV [2,11,12]. As an 
estimated 80% of ZIKV infections are asymptomatic 
and the genome detection window in serum is short 
[10], ZIKV diagnosis in pregnant women will often rely 
on ZIKV antibody detection in paired serum samples.
An important aspect of conducting ZIKV serology is 
expertise about flaviviruses because the interpreta-
tion is complex [10,30,32]. All laboratories conduct-
ing ZIKV serology indicated that they had experience 
with serodiagnostics for at least one other flavivirus. 
In addition, insight in the specificity and sensitivity 
of the serology tests used is required for proper test 
interpretation, but this appeared limited at the time of 
the questionnaire because adequate validation panels 
were lacking. Validation data provided by commercial 
entities typically need to be confirmed in order to be 
acceptable for an accreditation scheme [27]. Similarly, 
validation of such assays performed in another labo-
ratory may be insufficient to meet with accreditation 
requirements. Indeed, the availability of validation pan-
els for serology was indicated as the biggest challenge 
for implementation of ZIKV diagnostics by 21 of 44 ZIKV 
diagnostic laboratories. Five of the ZIKV diagnostic 
laboratories did not have any kind of ISO accreditation, 
Figure 4
Challenges indicated by EU/EEA laboratories that they were faced with during the implementation of ZIKV diagnostics, 
May 2016 (n = 44)
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while 17 of 44 laboratories did not have the most rel-
evant ISO 15189 accreditation [27]. Another concern is 
the broad reliance for ZIKV serology on one or two com-
mercial tests, although it should be noted that in May 
2016, the commercial market for ZIKV serology offered 
very limited options. In December 2016, no commer-
cial serology test had been accepted for procurement 
through the WHO Emergency Use Assessment and 
Listing procedure, which requires extensive validation 
[33]. This illustrates the importance of reference labo-
ratory capacity. Virus neutralisation is still considered 
the most specific flavivirus serology test, although 
cross-reactivity can be observed in patients with other 
flavivirus infections and research is ongoing to develop 
more specific assays [10,31,32,34]. Broad implementa-
tion of this confirmatory test in EU/EEA national refer-
ence laboratories is, however, expected to increase 
the reliability of serology results in returning travellers 
as the flavivirus background (in particular dengue) in 
European travellers is likely to be low.
Molecular testing, having capacity/capability to diag-
nose ZIKV, relied in 21 of 44 laboratories only on com-
mercial assays, in 14 laboratories only on in-house 
testing and in nine laboratories on both commercial 
and in-house testing. Only one (Lanciotti et al. [25]) 
of the two in-house tests that were most frequently 
used, was recommended based on in silico analysis 
[10] and in an independent comparative study of ZIKV 
molecular tests [35], raising possible concerns about 
the performance of diagnostics in some laboratories. 
In November 2016, the ECDC-funded emerging viral 
disease laboratory expert network (EVD-LabNet [36]) 
organised an external quality assessment (EQA) for 
member laboratories which included the majority of 
the national reference laboratories with ZIKV diagnos-
tics that participated in this questionnaire. The results 
from such an EQA will provide points of improvement to 
the individual laboratories [37].
For an adequate choice of which type of test to use 
and for correct interpretation of test results, a defined 
set of information on the patient history is essential. 
As shown for other diagnostics, the lack of informa-
tion provided by clinicians requesting the diagnostics 
proved to be a major gap [24]. Although the date of 
sampling was given most often (40/44 scored ‘often’ 
or ‘always’), this information is hardly meaningful with-
out an indication of the first day of illness (only scored 
in the highest categories by 27 laboratories). Reliable 
interpretation of ZIKV serology is impeded without 
information on previous flavivirus infections or vacci-
nations that was often/always available in only 17 of 
44 laboratories. Reimbursements rules for the diag-
nostic tests differ between countries (data not shown). 
If the state covers the costs for the diagnostic tests, 
provision of necessary background information can be 
mandatory.
The overall ZIKV diagnostic capacity in the 30 EU/EEA 
countries appeared to be sufficient, given the total 
number of reported requests vs the indicated capaci-
ties. At country level, the extent of under/overca-
pacities varied and were complicated by the fact that 
laboratories with certain ISO accreditations are bound 
by strict regulations when sending a surplus of sam-
ples to a backup laboratory. The availability of valida-
tion materials, positive controls and personnel were 
indicated as the main challenges for implementation 
of ZIKV diagnostics in the reference laboratories of the 
30 EU/EEA countries. That 15 of 44 laboratories indi-
cated the cost of commercial tests as an obstacle for 
test implementation and the large dependency of the 
laboratories on commercial assays, while five of 44 
laboratories did not receive funding for development 
and/or implementation of in-house tests, illustrate an 
Achilles’ heel in the preparedness for emerging infec-
tions and needs careful consideration when defining 
Table 1
Median size of different validation panels for Zika virus diagnostic serological tests, EU/EEA, May 2016 (n = 28 laboratories)
Number of laboratories Median size of validation panels (1st quartile; 3rd quartile)
Confirmed ZIKV patients 15 10 samples (3; 18.5)
Confirmed DENV patients 18 20 samples (10; 48)
Confirmed WNV patients 10 10 samples (5; 12)
Confirmed CHIKV patients 16 12 samples (9.75; 20)
Confirmed YFV, JEV or TBEV vaccinated 15 20 samples (10; 43)
EBV panel 10 15 samples (10; 45)
CMV panel 10 15 samples (10; 45)
Malaria panel 9 22 samples (10; 34)
Population panel own country 13 50 samples (20; 100)
Population panel endemic region 4 12.5 samples (8.25; 136.25)
Pregnancy panel 7 100 samples (39; 100)
CHIKV: chikungunya virus; CMV: cytomegalovirus; DENV: dengue virus; EBV: Epstein Barr virus; EU/EEA: European Union/European Economic 
Area; JEV: Japanese encephalitis virus; TBEV: tick-borne encephalitis virus; WNV: West Nile virus; YFV: yellow fever virus; ZIKV: Zika virus.
7www.eurosurveillance.org
strategies to strengthen laboratory preparedness and 
response for future outbreak situations.
Conclusion
While the coverage and capacity of ZIKV diagnostics in 
EU/EEA national reference laboratories were observed 
to suffice in May 2016, the assessment of the quality 
and needs indicated several crucial points of improve-
ment that will need support at national and EU/EEA 
level. All reference laboratories should seek to have a 
relevant ISO accreditation. Awareness and facilitation 
of (temporary) acceptance of laboratory accreditation 
for novel diagnostics implemented in emerging situa-
tions is required, although it is currently hampered by 
lack of availability of well-defined validation panels. 
Improved access is required to controls and valida-
tion panels for both molecular and serological tests. 
Pending the development of more specific serology 
tests, a broader implementation of the current most 
specific neutralisation tests (PRNT, VNT) is desirable, 
ideally in a comparative setting with other relevant fla-
viviruses. Increased awareness is needed among clini-
cians to provide all necessary background information, 
and systems should be implemented that assure pro-
vision of necessary interpretation data. National and/
or EU contingency funding should be established to 
ensure adequate and robust laboratory preparedness 
and response.
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